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Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity
Abstract
In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each member
veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with het-
erogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity,
the least e¢ cient member imposes her preferred e¤ort choice on the entire orga-
nization. The threat of forming an inner organization can undermine the veto
power of the less e¢ cient members and coerce them to exert more e¤ort. We also
identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is
executed. Finally, we show that majority rules e¤ectively prevent the emergence of
inner organizations.
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1 Introduction
Coordination of individual actions is the core problem that any society must solve to as-
sure the well-being of its members. The greater part of the economics literature focuses
on markets; arguably, organizations are an equally important coordination mechanism.
When studying organizations, economists typically presuppose the existence of a gover-
nance system consisting of rules, penalties or transfers. Club theory, for instance, assumes
that there is a system of transfers, taxes and entry fees that can be used to make members
of a club behave in accordance with the common interest (e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1996).
Similarly, organization theory presupposes the existence of a principal who coordinates
the members of an organization through the use of various monetary and non-monetary
instruments (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
In many circumstances, cooperation and organizations exist even if there is no compre-
hensive governance system. Agents who share a common goal can form a loosely knit
group. For example, sovereign states may come together to coordinate their actions in
specic areas, such as economic policies, protection of the environment, or defence. In
such situations, there is a priori no structure in place that determines how decisions are
taken: The member states must rst sort out how to decide. There is initially no other
decision rule but unanimity, as pointed out by Rousseau.1
Unanimity grants each member of an organization a veto right, thereby protecting
her against coercion or what de Tocqueville (1835) called the tyranny of the majority.
But the ipside of unanimity is slow and inexible decision-making and underprovision
of the common good. Heterogeneity is key here: Members who are less committed or less
productive can veto any proposal to increase contributions (e¤ort) to the common good.
The problem of holding back other, more productive, members becomes particularly
severe when there are complementarities between the members contributions. In the
presence of such weakest-linke¤ects, a member who invests too little, limits the amount
1Indeed, if there were no prior convention, where, unless the election were unanimous, would be the
obligation on the minority to submit to the choice of the majority? How have a hundred men who wish
for a master the right to vote on behalf of ten who do not? The law of majority voting is itself something
established by convention, and presupposes unanimity, on one occasion at least(Rousseau, 1762).
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of the common good for the entire organization.
We argue that organizations operating under the unanimity rule can, nonetheless,
provide more common goods than what their least committed members would prefer.
The mechanism that can overcome the veto power of the least committed members is the
threat of forming an inner club, or club-in-the-club.
To develop our argument we analyze the provision of a common good by an organiza-
tion in which decisions are taken by unanimity. Members jointly produce the good, with
each members e¤ort as the inputs; e¤ort should be broadly interpreted as any costly
contribution to a common good. The members di¤er in terms of their e¤ort cost. As
each member has veto power, the common good provision is determined by the weakest
link, that is, the member with the highest cost of e¤ort. To capture the essence of the
weakest link, we assume that the good is produced with a Leontief technology. This
precludes more productive club members from compensating (i.e., substituting) e¤ort
underprovision by less productive members. For the same reason, we exclude transfer
mechanisms that can induce club members to exert more e¤ort than they individually
prefer.
The mere possibility of forming a club-in-the-club can, however, increase the amount
of the good provided by the entire organization. The inner club admits only high e¤ort
providers. When staying outside is costly or when the inner club is associated with
deadweight losses, weaker members increase their e¤ort in order to avoid that the inner
club forms. The more committed members may in turn refrain from forming the inner
club, once all members increase their e¤ort. Thus, the threat of forming a club-in-the-
club limits the leverage less committed members have by virtue of their veto power, and
unanimity does not necessarily lead to stagnation.2
The club-in-the-club threat may also be executed. If so, an inner club provides its
members an additional good, but imposes a deadweight loss on the original organization.
We show that an inner club can emerge when the members are su¢ ciently heterogeneous
2Alternative reasons why less committed members may refrain from executing their veto rights such
as reputation or log-rolling rely on repeated interaction and low time-discount rates. By contrast, our
mechanism functions in a static model.
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and the deadweight loss is su¢ ciently small. In such a case, more productive members
prefer higher e¤ort with fewer contributors to lower e¤ort with more contributors. Putting
it di¤erently, the e¤ort level the less committed members are willing to exert to avoid the
formation of an inner club is not su¢ cient for compromise. Yhe two results above imply
that the club-in-the-club may lead to more integration - when the threat of an inner club
increases the organization-wide e¤ort, or less integration - when an inner club forms in
equilibrium.
We nally look at the e¤ect of a majority rather than a unanimity rule. Under a
majority rule the decisive member is more productive than under unanimity, suggesting
that a majority rule is a remedy against disintegration. This is indeed the case, and
supermajority rules often su¢ ce to prevent inner clubs. The required majority threshold
depends on the characteristics of the organization and is lower when members are more
heterogenous.
The logic of our theory applies to what we call loosely-knit organizations, that is,
organizations that do not (yet) have a governance structure in place that resolves or
alleviates incentive problems. The leading example is the European Union. In Section
7, we argue that important episodes of European integration are in line with the main
ideas of our theory. On a more general level, our theory considers organizations with the
following features: (i) members can engage in more than one purpose; (ii) inner clubs can
be formed that pursue a purpose beyond the initial one, and the inner clubs members
can decide who is admitted; (iii) no member can be excluded from the initial club.
In principle, one could think of other loosely-knit organizations the model could apply
to. For instance, home owners may form a residential community association to improve
safety or leisure facilities; groups of concerned citizens may form an NGO to protect the
environment or ght racism; national sport leagues may want to organize a European-
wide tournament. The challenge for these loosely knit groups and organizations is similar
to nd instruments to incentivize the members to contribute to the common goal.
However, the model ts these applications less well. First, the above organizations
tend to lack the manifold of purposes the EU can engage in (such as trade, social issues,
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research, common currency). Multi-dimensionality of purpose and the potential to keep
some members out of inner clubs are, however, necessary ingredients for inner clubs to
be an incentive device. Second, many other organizations that cover a broad range of
purposes have governance structures in place to overcome the obstacles owing to the
unanimity rule which is so important in the EU context. Thus, it seems to us that
the best eld of application (beyond the EU example) consists of other multi-country
associations like the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).
Our theory is related to the literature on secession. Our mechanism has common
features with the one in Buchanan and Faith (1987) on internal exitas an alternative to
voting with ones feet. In their theory, the optimal tax rate is the one that maximizes
revenues of a ruling coalition under the constraint of not triggering secession of other
members. In our theory, there is no ruling coalition and no taxes; everyone has a veto
right about club-wide contributions, but no veto right exists concerning the possibility of
forming an inner club. In Bolton and Roland (1997) secession involves lost economies of
scale in public good provision, but avoids the tyranny of the majorityby creating more
homogenous political entities.3 In our theory, inner clubs make it possible to increase
e¢ ciency in the outer club and there is no tyranny of the majority. Rather, in the
absence of the possibility of inner clubs, any individual is a tyrant as he can impose
his preferred contribution on the entire group. In general, our focus is not so much on
secessions that is, the complete separation of federations but rather on the creation
of costly internal structures. Further, we emphasize the potential function of the inner
organization threat as a mechanism to discipline less committed members. This contrasts
with Gradstein (2004) who argues that secession rights, while protecting minority rights,
involve ine¢ ciencies in bargaining processes. In our model, internal threats can increase
e¢ ciency (because they can induce higher e¤ort), or decrease it (as the formation of an
inner club entails a deadweight loss). An additional distinction is that the above papers
consider majority voting, while our main argument concentrates on the unanimity rule 
the natural rule for organizations with highly incomplete constitutions.
3Bordignon and Brusco (2001) point out that constitutionally dened secession rights involve a trade-
o¤: They reduce the cost of an actual break-up ex post, but they increase the likelihood of break-up.
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The idea of an inner club and its impact on the members of the initial organization can
also be found in the literature on cartel formation and its applications to the public goods
and the formation of international environmental agreements (see e.g., dAspremont et al.,
1983; Thoron, 1998; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006; Weikard, 2009). This literature
analyses cartel stability based on the incentives of the cartel members to leave and of
the outsiders to join. Similarly, the emergence of an inner club in our setting is stable
with respect to the participation decisions of the insiders and the outsiders. However,
the cartel stability literature predominantly considers homogenous agents and universally
assumes transferrable utility within the cartel - that is, that the cartel maximizes the sum
of its memberspayo¤s. These two assumptions result in a unique outcome associated
with a cartel of a given size. We consider a setting with heterogeneous members and do
not allow for transfers. In this setting there is no justication for the utilitarian welfare
perspective chosen by the cartel stability literature. Instead, we characterize the entire
set of outcomes compatible with the existence of an inner club. Furthermore, the threat
of an inner organization is a key point of our analysis, but is not addressed by the cartel
formation literature.
Our model indicates that organizations may choose to abandon unanimity and subject
their members to the will of the majority. This result is related to a growing literature
analyzing how constitutions form, in particular, what determines the voting rules of a
society. Aghion and Bolton (2003) identify a trade-o¤ between minority protection and
exibility. To adapt to changes, a society must o¤er transfers to some individuals to
prevent them from exercising their veto right. Hence, a society may under the veil of
ignorance decide to replace unanimity by some type of majority voting. Messner and
Polborn (2004) take a complementary view and show why societies may opt for super-
majorities rather than simple majority voting. In their model, young people, who vote
today over tomorrows decision rule, anticipate that they will benet less from reforms
when they are old. Hence, they want to have more power about future reforms, which
gives them an incentive to agree on a supermajority rule. Erlenmaier and Gersbach
(2004) argue that rst best outcomes can be achieved under unanimity, provided that it
6
is supplemented by a number of constitutional provisions, such as bundling of projects.
Compared to all these papers, the structure of our model is more parsimonious, in par-
ticular, as we are excluding side payments. In addition, we focus on the e¤ects of inner
group formation on the e¢ ciency of an organization in the absence of constitutional rules,
i.e., under voluntary cooperation.
Our theory is related to the long-standing policy debate about the institutional struc-
ture of the EU. Possible reform models are discussed in Dewatripont et al. (1995). Our
theory resembles the variable geometry and exible integration models. In variable geom-
etry, the EU would be separated in a core group and a periphery. In exible integration,
a country could be in the core for certain policy elds, and in the periphery for others. As
we only allow for one club-in-the-club, our theory bears more resemblance with variable
geometry, but exible integration is also in the spirit of our theory, if more than one
policy dimension were to be considered.
Dewatripont et al. (1995) are primarily concerned with nding the right governance
structure to e¤ectively deal with di¤erent policy dimensions. Our main interest is how
to get members to contribute to reform e¤orts in the absence of an elaborate governance
structure. Another di¤erence to Dewatripont et al. (1995) lies in the considered reform
opportunities. We examine an opportunity that provides the inner club members with a
benet, but imposes an externality on all members of the initial club. Dewatripont et al.
(1995) investigate other opportunities, for instance, when members have di¤erent degrees
of risk aversions, and hence some may be more willing to experiment than others. In that
case, there would be positive externalities rather than negative ones, because more risk
averse members can free-ride on the experimental e¤orts of the other members, which is
quite a di¤erent (albeit interesting) story.
Harstad (2006) investigates how exible cooperation (organization members can de-
cide on the speed of integration) compares to rigid cooperation (all members go at the
same speed). In his framework, exibility has the advantage of protecting members with
high costs from being forced to contribute to a public good. At the same time, exibility
gives rise to smaller contributions to the public good and/or free-riding, as positive ex-
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ternality of the public good is enjoyed also by the non-participating members. Our paper
is complementary: it considers negative externalities from an inner to an outer club and
argues than the threat of forming an inner club can have a disciplining role, pushing mem-
bers in the outer club to contribute more. In Dixit (2003) this role is played by network
externalities. Owing to these externalities, agents may sequentially adopt an innovation
(or join an organization) even though the introduction is not in their collective interest.
That is, adoption is individually rational, unless agents can coordinate their actions. In
our model, weaker members are in a similar situation they would prefer the threat of
forming an inner organization not to exist. In addition, stronger members can execute
the threat and form an inner organization, a possibility not explored by Dixit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines and solves the basic model in
which inner clubs are not an option. Section 3 introduces this possibility and examines the
impact that a threat of an inner club has on the initial organization. Section 4 derives the
conditions under which an inner club forms and characterizes the equilibrium outcomes.
Section 5 discusses key assumptions. Section 6 analyses organizations operating under
majority rules. Section 7 discusses European Integration as an illustration of our theory.
Concluding remarks are in Section 8. Formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Curse of Unanimity
We consider an organization with N members, who produce a common good.4 The
provision of the good increases in the size of the organization and in the e¤ort e of the
members. Inspired by Leontief partnership models (e.g., Vislie, 1994), we assume that
the amount of the good is determined by the smallest e¤ort in the organization, scaled
by the size of the organization: N min[e1; e2; :::eN ].
The utility of each member increases in the consumption and decreases in e¤ort. The
benet from consumption is the same for all members, whereas the e¤ort cost di¤ers
4Our interest is how an existing organization responds to new challenges for which its members have
di¤erent preferences. Hence, we abstract from the question of whether any given member has an incentive
to leave the organization or whether outsiders would like to join.
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across members. Member i 2 N has e¤ort cost ie2=2, and the type parameter i is
distributed on the support [; ]. Furthermore, the productivity di¤erence between any
two adjacent members is the same. We refer to  as the most productive or strongest
type, and to  as the least productive or weakesttype. Assigning rank 1 to the strongest
type , the cost parameter of the member with rank i is
i =  +
i  1
N   1
 
    : (1)
Given that the good is produced with a Leontief technology, member is payo¤ is
y(i; e) = N minfe1; ::eNg   ie2i =2.
As the members have di¤erent costs, their preferred amount of common good di¤ers.
Hence, some members could o¤er side payments to others in order to inuence their e¤ort
choices. However, we abstract from transfer payments in order to focus on the threat
of forming a club-in-the-clubas a mechanism to overcome the opposition of individual
members against reform proposals.5
Production of the good is modelled as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, members
vote on a minimum e¤ort level in the club and in the second stage each member simulta-
neously exerts an e¤ort. Individual e¤ort levels are veriable and each member commits
herself to exert - at least - the e¤ort level agreed upon in the voting stage. That is,
underprovision is innitely punished, but the voting outcome is not binding from above.
The asymmetry reects our interest in the constraints that unanimity imposes on orga-
nizations. However, unilateral overprovision is never an equilibrium outcome due to the
Leontief technology.6
In standard voting procedures agents vote over pairs of alternatives and the winner in
one round is posed against another alternative in the next round. Under the unanimity
rule, this procedure may easily fail to generate a unique winner. Further, the outcome of
5Frequently, transfers are not a feasible option because of a commitment problem, like in e.g., Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2000) in the context of democratization, or in Fearon (1995) in the context of
war.
6Due to the Leontief technology, there is also no loss of generality in assuming that the organization
votes on a common (minimum) e¤ort level as opposed to a menu of type-contingent e¤orts.
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the unanimity vote is highly sensitive to the order in which proposals are put to the vote,
as well as the default option in case none of the alternatives receives unanimous support.
That is, there is no robust unanimity voting procedure, and the literature has not agreed
on a standard modelling approach.
Motivated by the interest in the impact that the weakest member has on the club
production, we propose a procedure that parallels that of the continuous-time ascending-
bid auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).7 An uninterested agent (auctioneer) proposes
a sequence of continuously increasing e¤ort levels feg starting with the initial level e = 0.
After each proposal agents decide whether or not to vote in favour of a further increase
in the common e¤ort level. Once a member leaves the auction by voting against
an increase, she cannot return by supporting any subsequent proposals. Under the
unanimity rule, voting stops once a single member exits the vote. Accordingly, the option
to withdraw from the voting gives veto power to each member. After the voting stage,
members simultaneously choose their e¤ort and the good is produced.
In this game, Nash equilibria are outcomes in which all members exert some common
e¤ort e 2 0; N=, where N= is the e¤ort maximizing the payo¤ of the weakest type.
More precisely, any e¤ort e 2 0; N= can be supported in an equilibrium where at
least two members withdraw from the vote at some eV 2 [0; e] and where all members
choose the same e¤ort level e in production. Because of the Leontief technology, unilateral
overperformance (ei > e) is never protable. In turn, no member would want to withdraw
prior to eV , as eV  N=  N=i; where the latter is member is preferred e¤ort choice.
The formal proof is relegated to the Appendix.
It is well known that input games for a team with a Leontief technology have a
continuum of Nash equilibria and that these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. This also
holds for our voting game: All members prefer the Pareto-dominant equilibrium with
e = N= which we use as a benchmark in the subsequent analysis.
Proposition 1 Under unanimity, the weakest member of the organization executes her
7Our procedure is not robust either. For instance, a decending order would favor the productive
members.
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veto power, holding back the entire organization at her privately optimal choice.
Proposition 1 captures the idea that unanimity voting may result in the weakest mem-
ber blocking any attempt to increase organization-wide e¤ort. In principle, unanimity
could well favour stronger rather than weaker members of an organization. For example,
more productive (and wealthier) members would exercise their veto power if the organiza-
tion were to vote on redistribution and not on e¤ort. However, we follow the wide-spread
view that unanimity tends to protect weak members and to slow down reforms (e.g.,
Erlenmaier and Gersbach, 2004).
3 Undermining Veto Power
We now show how the veto power of weaker members can be undermined by the threat of
some members to form an inner organization. This threat may lead to three di¤erent
types of outcomes: i) initial organization, the equilibrium outcome with no inner orga-
nization and no additional e¤ort; ii) reformedorganization, the outcome with no inner
organization but higher organization-wide e¤ort; iii) dividedorganization, the outcome
with a club-in-the-club. Here we analyze the rst two outcome types and relegate the
analysis of divided organizations to the next section.
Each member can freely decide whether she wants to join the inner club. To keep the
analysis tractable, we abstract from the possibility of multiple inner organizations and
allow for at most one inner organization. Furthermore, the inner organization must have
at least two members (n  2). This is a natural restriction because an inner organization
provides a public - rather than private - good to its members.
Instead of adopting a multi-task framework (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) which
would view inner and outer club e¤orts as substitutes, we assume a negative externality
in consumption.8 An inner organization with n members reduces the utility of consuming
the outer club good for all N agents by n with   0. The term n characterizes a
8An alternative would be to assume that there is a lump-sum benet of being in the inner club. This
provides similar results, but a less rich set of possible inner club formations.
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deadweight loss (or a negative externality) associated with the existence of an inner club.9
For symmetry, we assume the production technology of the inner organization to be
the same as the one of the outer organization. Membership in the inner organization
generates additional per-capita benets of n(eIn   eOut), where eIn (eOut ) denotes the
minimal e¤ort exerted by anyone who is a member of the inner (outer) organization.
We use the term constellationfor a partitioning of members into an inner organi-
zation with n  N members, together with the associated e¤ort levels in the outer and
the inner organization. The payo¤ of type i who is a member of both the inner and the
outer organization is
yi = n(eIn   eOut) +NeOut   n  ie2i =2. (2)
The payo¤ of type j who is only a member of the outer organization is
yj = NeOut   n  je2j=2.
In general, the formation of an inner organization is sensitive to how agents coordinate,
for instance, who determines the e¤ort level eIn and/or the size n of the inner club. We
intentionally abstract from specic coordination mechanisms and let Nature choose eIn:10
This allows us to identify all constellations that can be supported as Nash equilibrium
outcomes. These constellations constitute the constraints of a potential decision-maker
under an arbitrary agenda-setting procedure.
The production of the outer and possible inner club goods takes place in three stages.
In the rst stage, members vote on the minimum e¤ort of the outer organization. As
before, voting follows the ascending procedure under the unanimity rule. In the second
stage, Nature draws eIn. Following the logic of the model, we restrict the possible draws
of nature to eIn > eOut. Having observed eIn, all members have the option to simultane-
9An example of such an externality is the impact that the euro has on equity trades. Coeurdacier and
Martin (2009) show that the European monetary union has made the non-euro Scandinavian countries
less attractive for equity holders of euro countries.
10Endogenizing the choice of eIn poses both technical and severe conceptual problems. If the size of the
inner club were given, one can think of a procedure generating eIn compatible with this size. However,
there is no obvious rationale for either selecting a particular inner club size, or choosing the inner club
size prior to the amount of the inner club good. Last but not least, any procedure that simultaneously
determines n and eIn would be highly arbitrary.
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ously subscribe to join the inner club. By subscribing, a member commits to exert eIn.
Otherwise, she gets innitely punished. In the nal stage, all members simultaneously
choose their e¤ort and the club goods are produced.
We make two further simplifying assumptions whose implications are discussed in
Section 5. First, Natures draw eIn is strictly binding in the sense that inner club members
have to exert exactly eIn, neither less nor more. Second, each members decision to
withdraw from the voting is non-strategic in the sense of ignoring its impact on the
subsequent subscription decision of other members.
The latter assumption pins down a unique voting outcome, as each member i with-
draws at her preferred e¤ort level N=i. So the weakest member ends the voting by
exiting at eV = eOut = N=.
If Nature draws a moderate level of eIn, there exists a Nash equilibrium where all
members subscribe to join the inner organization and exert exactly eIn. Consider the
choice of the weakest member when all other members subscribe to eIn. If she also
subscribes, she should exactly match eIn. If she abstains from joining, an inner club of
size N 1 forms. She then sets the outer-club e¤ort to her most preferred level eN = N=.
This option entails lower disutility of e¤ort but also lower consumption and in addition
the deadweight loss (N   1). By comparing respective payo¤s
NeIn   e2In=2  N(N=)  (N   1)  
 
N=
2
=2 (3)
and using the constraint eIn > eOut, we get that the weakest type prefers to join the inner
organization for all e¤orts
eIn 2

N=;N= +
q
2(N   1)=

:
If type N joins the inner club, so do all other types because they have lower e¤ort cost.
Consequently, there exists an equilibrium with all N members choosing the same e¤ort
level eIn as long as eIn does not exceed eRO = N= +
q
2(N   1)=.
Proposition 2 Reformed organizations can emerge for any  > 0 and eIn 2
 
N=; eRO

.
That is, the threat of forming an inner club undermines the veto power of the weakest
13
member and increases organization-wide e¤ort.
Unanimity is commonly viewed as preventing majorities from coercing minorities at
the cost of organizational inertia or inability of adjusting. Proposition 2 shows that this
view needs to be qualied: Unanimity need not be tantamount to complete protection of
weaker members or, equivalently, to the inability to reform. The threat of forming an inner
organization can undermine the veto power of each single member and may enable the
organization to reform. To be an e¤ective reform mechanism, two conditions must hold.
First, the statutes of the organization must exempt the formation of an inner organization
from unanimous approval. Otherwise, weaker members would have no reason to avoid
the formation of an inner organization by exerting more e¤ort. Rather, they could simply
veto its formation. Second, the inner organization must impose some externalities on the
outer organization. Otherwise, the weaker members have no incentives to increase their
e¤ort beyond their privately optimal level. The reform potential of an organization,
measured by the di¤erence eRO N=, increases with the deadweight loss associated with
an inner organization and with the size of the initial organization.
4 Club-in-the-club
We have so far only looked at equilibrium constellations in which there are no inner
organizations in equilibrium. We here explore the set of constellations with divided orga-
nizations that can be supported as Nash equilibrium outcomes for any given deadweight
loss .
Assume an inner organization exists. Due to non-strategic voting, all agents who do
not subscribe to the inner club exert eOut = eV = N=. As the inner club e¤ort level eIn,
drawn by Nature, is binding, all members who join the inner organization exert eIn.
For expositional simplicity, we only consider inner clubs with n 2 f3; :::; N   2g, where
the relevant participation constraints have the same functional form. While our setting
allows for n = 2 or n = N   1, the respective participation constraints di¤er slightly in
these two cases (see Appendix for details).
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We rst establish which types are members of both the inner and outer organization.
Lemma 1 Provided that an inner organization of size n 2 f3; :::; N 2g is an equilibrium
outcome, its members are the n most productive types i 2 f1; :::; ng.
The benets of the inner club membership, given by the rst term in (2), are indepen-
dent of the type i. In turn, the cost of exerting an extra e¤ort is increasing in i. Hence,
given the equilibrium inner club has n members, these must be the n most productive
agents.
The above result implies that an inner organization forms in equilibrium if the follow-
ing two constraints are satised:
n
 
eIn  N=
    n e2In   (N=)2 /2 , (4)
(n+ 1)
 
eIn  N=
   < n+1 e2In   (N=)2 /2 . (5)
The rst condition ensures that the marginal, i.e. least productive, member of the
inner organization prefers to be member in both the inner and the outer organization.
The second condition ensures that the most productive member in the outer organization
prefers to be member in the outer organization only. We assume that type n + 1 does
not join in case she is indi¤erent, which accounts for the strict inequality in the non-
participation constraint (5).
We now establish the conditions for the existence of divided organizations and then
characterize constellations supporting inner organizations of di¤erent size.
An increase in the size of the inner organization benets all its members as it rises
the provision of the inner public good. However, the less productive agents may nd it
too costly to exert the requested e¤ort level eIn. Hence, any inner organization strikes
a balance between size and productivity of its marginal member. This trade-o¤ has no
interior solution if the productivity di¤erences among (two adjacent) members is relatively
small. That is, when the N members are relatively homogeneous, an inner organization
never forms in equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 An inner club can only emerge if agents are su¢ ciently heterogeneous,
N < =.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that the heterogeneity conditionN < =
holds. This is, however, only a necessary condition for the existence of inner organizations.
Rather intuitively, the size of the deadweight loss and the level of the inner club e¤ort,
drawn by Nature, also matter. Indeed, even when members are heterogeneous, divided
organizations only exist for certain pairs of (eIn; ).
Denote by 
 the set of all pairs (eIn; ) that satisfy the two inequalities
3
 
eIn  N=
    3 e2In   (N=)2 /2 ; (6)
(N   1)  eIn  N=   < N 1 e2In   (N=)2 /2 : (7)
where (6) is type 3s participation constraint, (7) is type N   1s non-participation con-
straint, and eIn > N=. These constraints dene the largest set of pairs (eIn; ) that
support a divided organization outcome.
Indeed, su¢ cient heterogeneity implies that the e¤ort cost n increases faster than n.
Hence, if the non-participation constraint
n(eIn   eout)   < n

e2In   e2Out

=2:
holds for n = 3, it holds for all less productive types k > 3. That is, if type 3 does not
want to be the marginal member of the inner club of size 3, no type k > 3 wants to be
the marginal member of the inner club of size k. At the same time, if type n wants to be
the marginal member of the inner club of size n, any more productive type k < n has the
same preference. Finally, member N   1s non-participation constraint has to be met, as
we only consider inner clubs of size n 2 f3; ::; N   2g.
Proposition 4 Provided that types are su¢ ciently heterogenous, an inner club of size
n 2 f3; ::; N   2g can form in equilibrium i¤ the pair (eIn; ) belongs to the set 
.
Moreover, for each pair (eIn; ) the size of the inner club is unique.
Figure 1 depicts the set of pairs (; eIn) that can support divided organizations. The
16
outer border of the set is determined by the participation constraint of type 3 and the inner
border by the non-participation constraint of type N 1. Intuitively, type 3 refrains from
subscribing to the inner club, if the deadweight loss  is very high. Signing up for very
high e¤ort level eIn is too costly for type 3, so, again, she stays in the initial organization.
Also, if the inner club e¤ort level is not very di¤erent from the outer club one, there is
little value for type 3 in joining the inner club and su¤ering the dead-weight loss . By
the same logic, type N 1 stays out unless  is very small and/or eIn is close to the outer
club e¤ort level.11
q/N
qq //6 3 N-
qq //)1(2 1 NN N -- -
l
eIn
W
Figure 1
The uniqueness is easily understood by analyzing two inner organizations that di¤er
in size by one member. Recall that an inner organization of size n consists of the n most
productive members, as established by Lemma 1. If an e¤ort level eIn and a deadweight
loss e are compatible with an inner organization of size k, type k prefers being member
of an inner club of size k to being an outsider of an inner club of size k   1. But this
immediately implies that an inner club of size k   1 cannot be an outcome for the pair
(e; eIn), as type k would not stay outside. More generally, heterogeneity implies that
11Setting  = 0 in the participation constraints and rearranging yields the respective eIn intercepts.
17
if type k does not want to be the marginal member of an inner organization of size k,
neither of types k + 1; k + 2; ::: wants to be the marginal member of the inner club of
respective size. Therefore, inner clubs with non-adjacent size cannot coexist either.
qq //)1(2 Nn n -+
q/N
qq //2 Nn n -
l
eIn
qq //)1(2 1 Nn n -- -
qq //)2(2 2 Nn n -+ +
0
1-Wn
nW
1+Wn
Figure 2
The uniqueness result means that the set 
 can be partitioned into subsets 
n,
each corresponding to all pairs (; eIn) consistent with an inner organization of size n.
Each subset 
n is determined by type ns participation constraint and type n+ 1s non-
participation constraint. As can be seen at Figure 2, these subsets have an onion-like
shape with the outer layers enclosing the pairs compatible with smaller inner organiza-
tions. Intuitively, for high  the di¤erence in the e¤ort costs between the marginal inner
club member n and the least productive type needs to be su¢ ciently high, otherwise n
stays outside. For a given type distribution it means that the size of the maximum sup-
portable inner club shrinks as  increases. The formal characterization of 
n is provided
in the Appendix.
The uniqueness of divided organization does not imply uniqueness of the equilibrium
outcome. Indeed, the initial organization can be supported as an equilibrium for any
parameter values. This follows from the assumption that an inner organization must
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have at least two members. Hence, if all other members choose not to join, no single
member has an incentive to deviate from this common pattern. In addition, if the e¤ort
eIn is not too high, the reformed organization can also exist in equilibrium. Finally,
coexistence of initial, reformed and divided organizations requires moderate levels of eIn
and deadweight loss ; coupled with su¢ cient heterogeneity of members.12
5 Discussion
Throughout the analysis, we rely on several core assumptions to keep the model tractable.
We now discuss their implications for the results. The assumption of equidistantly dis-
tributed types delivers a generic functional form for the participation constraints of the
inner club members. The essential feature ensuring the formation of divided organiza-
tion is the heterogeneity of types, that is, the most preferred e¤ort of the marginal inner
club member en(n) = n=n is decreasing in the club size. We are condent that any
distribution satisfying this property can generate divided organization equilibria. The
thicknessof the 
n-layers would, however, di¤er as compared to the equidistant dis-
tribution. The distribution has no impact on the formation of the initial and reformed
organizations in equilibrium, as they are solely determined by the decisions of the least
productive member.
In the model, Natures draw eIn is assumed to be binding not only from below but -
unlike in the voting stage - also from above. This simplifying assumption ensures that the
members of the inner club exert precisely eIn which for a given deadweight loss  yields a
unique divided organization. If inner club members were free to exert a higher e¤ort than
what Nature draws, inner clubs of di¤erent size could emerge in equilibrium. Suppose
that a pair (eIn; ) supports an inner club of size n. Then, by coordinating to work
harder than eIn, the most productive m < n members can form an inner organization in
equilibrium. To see this, consider a point (~eIn; ~) 2 
n in Figure 2. The ray along the
vertical line  = ~ starting at ~eIn and corresponding to an increase in eIn, crosses all the
12For details on the coexistence we refer the reader to Berglof et al. (2009).
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sets 
n 1, 
n 2,...,
3. Setting the inner club e¤ort to equal exactly the Nature drawn
level allows us to convey our ideas, while keeping the analysis tractable.
While we restrict our analysis to a single inner club, the logic of our model seems
compatible with multiple inner organizations. For example, if Nature draws two eIn, a
plausible equilibrium candidate is a constellation with two inner clubs, the most produc-
tive types being members of both inner clubs, intermediate types joining the outer-inner
club and the least productive types being only in the outer organization. However, the
outcomes in such an extended framework will depend on modelling details such as the
assumed interaction between the deadweight loss of di¤erent inner clubs, and single vs.
multiple inner club membership.
Finally, we turn to the assumption of non-strategic voting. While it is a standard
assumption in many political economy models, it may be limiting in our framework.
Indeed, the prospect of an inner club provides the members of the initial organization
with the incentive to behave strategically in the voting stage. On the one hand, more
productive types may choose to withdraw from the voting before the least productive
member would pull out when voting sincerely. While this reduces the provision of the
outer club good, it may induce more members to subscribe to the emerging inner club.
On the other hand, less productive members may remain in the voting beyond their
most preferred level. Though costly, the extra e¤ort reduces the attractiveness of an
inner club, thereby lowering the number of its potential members and the consequent
deadweight loss, or even preventing its formation altogether.
Therefore, allowing for strategic voting would likely alter the e¤ort level of the outer
club and the size of the inner organization. Nonetheless, we would expect to observe the
same types of organizational outcomes: divided as well as reformed and initial organiza-
tions. In addition, the game may feature an equilibrium in which all members exert an
e¤ort below the most preferred level of the least productive member.
It is worth noting that strategic voting entails certain costs but uncertain benets.
When a highly productive member withdraws early, the outer club good is provided at the
lower level. At the same time, a larger inner club may or may not materialize depending
20
on the draw of eIn. More generally, the benets of strategic voting depend on the extent
to which the agent can inuence or correctly anticipate the subsequent decision (i.e., the
level eIn). Our setting abstracts from any specic agenda setting procedure and lets eIn
be randomly chosen by Nature. In this complex environment, the benets of strategic
voting seem particularly limited, making the sincere voting assumption less restrictive
than it may seem at rst glance.
6 Majority Rules
In the divided organization outcome, weaker members are not forced to provide more
e¤ort than their privately optimal choice. Thus, unanimity protects weak members from
the tyranny of the majority but at the price of the formation of a club-in-the-club. Many
clubs may want to avoid becoming a two-class organization. One possible remedy is a
majority rule since it limits the decision power of the weak members. This reduces the
extent to which more productive members are held back which in turn may prevent the
formation of inner clubs.
We now consider organizations operating under di¤erent majority rulesM(m), where
the majority threshold m 2 [0:5; 1) corresponds to the required fraction of supporting
votes. As before, voting follows the ascending procedure, but under theM(m) majority
rule it ends once a fraction (1   m) of agents has chosen to leave the auction.13 In
the second stage Nature draws a (potential) inner club e¤ort that exceeds the one voted
upon in the rst stage.
Under majority ruleM(m), the organization-wide e¤ort emOut coincides with the best-
preferred choice of its decisive member mN . For instance, the median type 0:5N is
decisive in case of the simple majority rule M(0:5), and the resulting e¤ort is e0:5Out =
N=0:5N . As the majority threshold m increases the decisive member mN becomes less
productive and the organization-wide e¤ort emOut declines. Hence, stronger members have
more incentives to form an inner organization. If majority rules are at all e¤ective in
13For notational simplicity, we abstract from the integer problem.
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preventing inner clubs, they must have su¢ ciently low thresholds.14
Proposition 5 Under the simple majority rule a divided organization never emerges.
The high organization-wide e¤ort level under the simple majority ruleM(0:5) makes
inner clubs no longer attractive even for the most productive members. That is, there
are no pairs (ein; ) that support the formation of an inner organization of any size.
While the simple majority rule succeeds in preventing inner clubs, it leaves weaker
members without protection against the tyranny of the majority. Clearly, a supermajority
rule would coerce weaker members less. But can it still preclude the formation of an
inner organization? The analysis so far has shown that divided organizations form under
unanimity rule (m = 1), provided agents are heterogenous. Proposition (5) establishes
the inexistence of inner club equilibria under the simple majority rule (m = 0:5). Based
on a continuity argument one may expect this result to be obtained already under a
qualied majority rule.
Proposition 6 For any initial organization (; ;N) there exists a majority threshold
m(; ;N) > 1=2 such that no inner organization emerges under all majority rulesM(m)
with m < m(; ;N). The threshold m(; ;N) decreases as agents become more hetero-
geneous.
The exact majority threshold depends on the characteristics of the organization.
When an organization is more heterogeneous, as measured by an increase in  (decrease
in ), the incentives of its members are less aligned. Under a given majority rule, produc-
tive members are held back to a larger extent, which makes them more eager to form an
inner organization. This tendency can be counteracted by a lower majority threshold. It
increases the productivity of the decisive club member and the organization-wide e¤ort
level, thereby eliminating incentives to form an inner club.
14For the same reason as under unanimity, initial organization with all members exerting emOut is
always an equilibrium outcome under the majority ruleM(m). Similarly, one can also support reformed
organization equilibria.
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7 European Integration
The evolution of the European Union (EU) provides tting examples of our theory. To
map the model into the EU experience, important concepts are: the benet of the public
good, the e¤ortof the members, and the heterogeneity of the costs associated with this
e¤ort.
The benet of the public good European integrationhas many dimensions, but the
main goal has been to bring about cooperation and to assure peace. Some examples are
the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community in which France, the Benelux countries,
Italy and Germany coordinated their actions in these industries. On March 25, 1957, the
six countries signed the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community
(EEC) with a view to promote trade among its member states. Further public goods were
the creation of a single currency with its reduction of transaction costs in intra-European
trade and the further extension of the integrated market through various enlargement
waves.
Our notion of e¤ort also has multiple interpretations in the context of the EU. For
instance, to reap the benets of European integration, countries must go through a num-
ber of adjustment processes that take the time of politicians and bureaucrats, but also
impose costs on the population. Laws must be changed and harmonized; languages must
be learnt; opening markets exposes rms and workers to more competition. Reaching
the Maastricht criteria in particular, committed national and subnational bodies alike to
budgetary austerity, often with massive consequences for the population. Probably most
important is the loss of sovereignty. This is a severe concern as the referenda and discus-
sion about the Lisbon treaty show: countries like Ireland, Poland, the Czech Republic
or Germany have been substantially delaying ratication of the treaty, because public
and parliament alike were concerned about sovereignty in general (the recent debate in
Germany is about the role of national parliaments in EU integration decisions) or quite
specic questions, such as abortion law in Ireland.
Heterogeneity between members can be treated in the model in two di¤erent ways.
One could consider heterogeneity in the value associated with European integration, or
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as we do in the model, one can map heterogeneity into the cost function. The modeling
strategies give similar results; in reality it is not straightforward to distinguish whether
one or the other would be the source of heterogeneity. An early example is the plan
for integration into a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954. The French Parlia-
ment objected ratication and thus vetoed further integration. Whether France valued
common defense lower than other members or estimated the costs (the potential loss of
sovereignty) higher than others, seems a question that is secondary to our model. What
is important, though, is to see the heterogeneity across countries in terms of the net
benets of integration.
Beyond justifying the structure of the model, it is also important to see to what
extent outcomes of our model are in line with the reality of European integration. The
failure of the European Defense Community is an early example of reform e¤orts that got
vetoed by a member. The EU then saw many blocked reforms, but during the second half
of 1980s, European Commission President Jacques Delors and some of the governments
of stronger member states pushed for further integration. This process resulted in the
Treaty of Maastricht, which states in article 2: This Treaty marks a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.
The core proposal to re-vitalize the EU was the creation of a common currency area
with strict criteria for joining the club-in-the-club, the European Monetary Union.
Reaching the Maastricht criteria on public debt, decit, interest rates and ination meant
to undertake e¤orts for each of the aspiring membership candidates. Naturally, these
e¤orts would be more painful for countries with larger budgetary problems, such as
Belgium, Greece or Italy. However, the benets of further integration and the creation
of a joint currency would accrue to all participating members.
Arguably, the process of reaching the criteria led to a revitalization of the European
integration process and a phase of growth.15 In the language of our model a group of
economically stronger countries brought forward a proposal that was open to everyone.
However, inclusion in the new club Euroland was only possible after exerting substantial
15The fact that some of the e¤ort was not veriable as the example of Greece shows, is beyond the
scope of our model.
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e¤orts. The threat of forming such an inner club that would have excluded the under-
performers seems to have worked. The countries that wanted to join managed to reach
the criteria.
Our model also predicts that the risk of club-in-the club formation increase when
heterogeneity of members increases and that a move from unanimity to qualied majority
can be a remedy. Indeed, the initial members of the European Community had quite
similar aims and economic structures. Through a number of subsequent enlargement
waves, the economic heterogeneity of EU members increased, thereby altering matters
considerably. With the southern periphery joining, the challenge of keeping the new
Union together had to be confronted as the size and use of structural funds, the state of
labor markets and public administration provided ample reasons for conict.
The Single European Act of Luxembourg (1986) can be seen as a rst mild response.
Here, unanimity was abandoned for many policy issues. This voting reform substantially
reduced each single members veto power. Despite such reforms, growing concerns about
paralysis in the EU have spurred discussions about a two-speed Europe. Representatives
of the stronger founding members, France and Germany (President Chirac and Former
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer) proposed to allow a subset of EU members to cooperate
and integrate more. As in our model, larger heterogeneity increases the likelihood that
inner clubs may form. As a response, the summit in Nice in 2000 explicitly set out
to address the institutional problems associated with enlargement by re-weighting the
allocation of votes in the Council and by extending qualied majority voting to an even
larger number of areas. The 2001 intergovernmental conference in Nice was supposed
to facilitate decision-making in the new larger Union and by regulating the formation
of inner clubs through the instrument of enhanced cooperationamong members. The
Reform Treaty of 2007 regulates further the instrument of enhanced cooperation among
sub-groups of countries, and reinforced the sole right of the Commission to formally
propose such initiatives. The Reform Treaty also redenes qualied majority voting into
double majority voting whereby a minimum of 55 per cent of Member States representing
a minimum of 65 per cent of EUs population are required to pass legislation.
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Thus, the dynamics of the European Unions voting system is well in line with the
logic of our theory in which the majority thresholds decline in the heterogeneity of club
members.
8 Concluding Remarks
The paper presents a theory of loosely-knit organizations. While members have a common
interest, there is no governance mechanism in place that enforces contributions to the
common good. Hence, organization-wide decisions must be taken unanimously, granting
each member veto power. We show that there are nonetheless ways for such organizations
to avoid being held back by their least committed members. The threat of forming a club-
in-the-club can induce members that are less interested or less productive to contribute
more to the common good than privately preferred. Key for this mechanism is that the
formation of a club-in-the-club imposes a deadweight loss on all members, but benets
only those who join the inner club. Then, unanimity does not preclude reform, in the
sense of all members exerting more e¤ort than is preferred by its weakest members.
We also show that identical organizations can end up quite di¤erently: some may
stagnate at the level preferred by its weakest members, others may reform, and yet
others may be divided by the formation of an inner club. Furthermore, the divided
organization outcome is more likely when members are more heterogenous. To avoid this
outcome an organization can adopt a majority rule. This constitutional change results in
a higher organization-wide e¤ort, and thus, often precludes the formation of an inner club.
The change can be interpreted as a way of institutionalizing the reformed organization
outcome, feasible under unanimity.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Nash equilibrium in the original game (Section 2)
Given some eV , member is decision problem at the implementation stage is
max
eieV
 
N minfe; eig   ie2i =2

.
Member is preferred choice ei = N=i exceeds e, as e  N=  N=i. Thus, member i
always chooses ei = e, since any e¤ort ei   e > 0 would be wasted. Note that the voting
outcome eV needs not to be binding as all members can choose to exert higher e¤ort
e  eV .
At the voting stage member is only deviation that inuences the outcome of the game
is to withdraw prior to eV . This deviation is protable i¤ eV > N=i. By withdrawing at
eVi  N=i and choosing ei = N=i; member i attains her rst best in the implementation
stage. Since this applies to all members i = 1; ::; N ,
eV  N= (8)
must hold in equilibrium. Consequently, any e¤ort e > N= cannot be an equilibrium
outcome. Indeed, if everyone but member N chooses e, member Ns unilateral underper-
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formance (eN = N= < e) is both protable and compatible with the voting outcome as
N=  eV by (8).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
For an inner organization of size n to exist, two types of constraints must be satised.
First, N   n members of the outer organization must prefer staying in the outer organi-
zation rather than joining the inner organization. Second, the n members must prefer to
be in the inner organization.
An agent i chooses to be a member of the inner organization if the following condition
holds:
n(eIn   eOut) +NeOut   n  ie2In=2  NeOut   (n  1)  ie2Out=2.
Rearranging yields
n(eIn   eout)    i

e2In   e2Out

/2 . (9)
The LHS of this constraint is independent of the type i, whereas the RHS increases in
i. Thus, if condition (9) holds for type i, it must hold for all more productive types
j = 1; :::; i  1.
A.3 Inner clubs of size n=2 and n=N-1
For the inner clubs of size n 2 3; :::; N   2 the participation constraints (4) and (5) only
di¤er with respect to the size of the inner club and the marginal membersproductivity.
For the inner club with n = N 1 members, the non-participation constraint of type n+1
is di¤erent. If type N were to join the inner organization, all members would exert the
same e¤ort and an inner organization would cease to exist. Thus, the non-participation
constraint of type N is


e2In   (N=)2

=2  (N   1) > N(eIn  N=).
A similar e¤ect appears in the case of the inner club of size n = 2. As we do not allow
for inner clubs consisting of one member, if type 2 does not join, the inner club fails to
form. This is reected in type 2s participation constraint
2
 
eIn  N=
  2  2 e2In   (N=)2 2:
These modied constraints do not substantially change the analysis, but they lead to
di¤erent functional forms of the set of equilibrium e¤ort level eIn.
29
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof by contradiction. If an equilibrium with an inner organization of size n < N exists,
n(eIn  N=)   > n
h
e2In  

N=
2i
/2
and eIn > eOut must hold. Setting eIn = N= +  and inserting it in the rst condition
yields
(n N n ) >
n
2
2
+ .
This can only hold if (n   Nn=) > 0 or, equivalently, (n=n   N=) > 0. Using the
denition
n =
1
N   1

(N   n) + (n  1) ,
the di¤erence (n=n  N=) can be written as
(N   1)n
(N   n) + (n  1)   N > 0.
Rearranging yields
(N   n)


(N   n) + (n  1)    N > 0
which contradicts N  =.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The participation constraint (4) of type n, the marginal member in an inner club of size
n, can be rewritten as
n
 
eIn  N=
    (n  1) + (N   n)
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2
or, equivalently
n
 
eIn  N=
 
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
!
 N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + : (10)
Similarly the non-participation constraint of the type n+1 can be written as
[n+ 1]
 
eIn  N=
 
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
!
<
N   
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + : (11)
(As before, if type n+ 1 is indi¤erent, she does not join). Dene a function of x and eIn
F (x; eIn) = x
 
eIn  N=
 
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
!
.
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As the LHS of inequalities (10) and (11) coincide with F (n; eIn) and F (n+1; eIn) respec-
tively, an inner club of size n exerting an e¤ort eIn can form in equilibrium if
F (x; eIn)  N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 +  (12)
holds for x = n, but fails for x = n+ 1.
We begin by proving uniqueness. Consider a pair (e0In; 
0). As by construction we
only consider e0In > N=,
1 
   
N   1
 
e0In +N=

2
< 1 
   
N   1

N= +N=
2

:
Given that the types are heterogeneous (N < =),
1 
   
N   1

N= +N=
2

=
(N   1)   N +N
N   1 =
N   
N   1 < 0:
Thus, the coe¢ cient of x in F (x; e0In) is negative, that is, F (x; e
0
In) is decreasing in x for
given e0In. As the RHS of (12) is a constant for given model parameters and e
0
In, there
will be at most one n such that
F (n; e0In) 
N   
N   1
h
(e0In)
2   (N=)2
i
=2 + 0;
(13)
F (n+ 1; e0In) <
N   
N   1
h
(e0In)
2   (N=)2
i
=2 + 0;
which proves the uniqueness part.
To prove existence, it is enough to notice that conditions (6) and (7) are equivalent
to:
F (3; eIn)  N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + ; (14)
F (N   1; eIn) < N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + ; (15)
Therefore, by the continuity of F (:) it follows that for any pair (e0In; 
0) 2 
, there exists
a n 2 [3; N   2] such that the system (13) holds, which, in turn, implies that this n
is the equilibrium size of the inner club. Similarly, if (e00In; 
00) =2 
, at least one of the
conditions (14) and (15) fails. Without loss of generality assume that it is condition (14).
As F (x; e00In) is decreasing in x for given e
00
In
F (3; e00In) <
N   
N   1
h
(e00In)
2   (N=)2
i
=2 + 00 )
F (n; e00In) <
N   
N   1
h
(e00In)
2   (N=)2
i
=2 + 00 for any n > 3.
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This immediately implies that a club of size n  3 cannot form in equilibrium as the
participation constraint of n-th type, the marginal member in an inner club of size n,
does not hold.
A.6 Characterization of the 
n Sets
We partition the set 
 into subsets 
n each corresponding to the pairs (eIn; ) consistent
with an inner organization of size n. Each of these subsets is determined by a pair of
inequalities (4) and (5), or, equivalently, (10) and (11).
Proposition A1: Provided that types are heterogenous, an inner club of size n can form
in equilibrium i¤ the pair (eIn; ) belongs to the set 
n, where n 2 f3; :::; N   2g.
Proof: The denition of 
n implies that all pairs (eIn; ) 2 
n can be supported by
an inner club of size n. We are only left to show that if a pair (e0In; 
0) =2 
n, then a club
of size n cannot form. Indeed, in this case either type n does not want to be a member
of a club of size n, or type n+ 1 does not want to stay outside of club of size n (or both),
by the denition of 
n.
Proposition A2: Consider two pairs (eIn; 0) 2 
, (eIn; 00) 2 
, 00 > 0. Then the
size n0 of the inner club associated with (eIn; 
0) is at least as high as the size of the
inner club n00 associated with (eIn; 
00).
Proof: If an inner club of size n0 supports (eIn; 0), the non-participation condition
of type n0 + 1 is given by
F (n0 + 1; eIn) <
N   
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + 0.
As 00 > 0
F (n0 + 1; eIn) <
N   
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + 00.
But this immediately implies that type n0 + 1 wants to be an outsider of club of size n0
exerting e¤ort eIn also for 
00. As F (x; e0In) decreases in x, we conclude that n
00  n0
(with strict inequality for su¢ ciently large di¤erence between 00 and 0). Thus, higher
deadweigth loss  is compatible with clubs of smaller size.
Comments to the shape of 
n:
As the set 
n is dened by inequalities (4) and (5), the outer and the inner border of

n in (eIn; )-space are given by quadratic parabolas with respect to -coordinate:
 =  ne2In + neIn +

n
(N=)2
2
  n  N=
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and
 =  n+1e2In + (n+ 1) eIn +

n+1
(N=)2
2
  (n+ 1)  N=
respectively. Notice that the pair (N=; 0) belongs to both parabolas. Further, the
symmetry axes of these parabolas are given by type ns best preferred e¤ort level, en(n) =
n=n and type n+ 1s best preferred e¤ort level, en+1(n+ 1) = (n+ 1) =n+1 respectively.
Lemma A1: If types are heterogeneous, N < =, n=n decreases with n.
Proof. Subtracting (n+1)=n+1 from n=n and using the denition n = +(n  1) ( 
)=(N   1) yields
n
n
  n+ 1
n+1
=
nn+1   (n+ 1)n
nn+1
=
[(n+ 1)(n+1   n)  n+1]
nn+1
=
1
(N   1)nn+1

(n+ 1)(   )  (N   1)   n(   )
=
1
(N   1)nn+1

  N > 0, if and only if N    < 0:
Combined with the discussion above these results explain the shape and relative po-
sition of subsets 
n on Figure 2.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof by contradiction. If an equilibrium with an inner organization of size n < N exists,
n(eIn   eOut)   > n

e2In   e2Out

/2 (16)
and eIn > eOut must hold where
eOut =
N
m + (1 m)
is the best preferred outer-club e¤ort of the decisive member under the majority rule
M(m). Setting eIn = N=(m + (1 m)) +  and inserting it in equation (16) yields
n     n
2

2
N
m + (1 m) + 
2

,
or equivalently,


n
n
  N
m + (1 m)

 
2
2
+

n
> 0.
This condition can only be satised if
n
n
>
N
m + (1 m) . (17)
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Inserting the explicit expression (1) for n and rearranging yields
m > 1  1
n
(N   n)    N
(N   1)      . (18)
As
(N   n)    N
(N   1)      < 1; (19)
inequality (18) implies that the necessary condition for formation of an inner club of size
n is
m > 1  1
n
 1
2
; (20)
as an inner club should have at least two members. Simple majority threshold m = 1=2
never satises condition (20). We conclude that under the majority threshold m = 1=2
any divided organization ceases to exist.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider condition (18). Its RHS is increasing in n (as N < =). Thus, if condition
(18) fails for n = 2, i.e., club of size 2 ceases to exist, then any larger club also ceases to
exist. Therefore, no divided organization emerges as long as the majority threshold m
prevents formation of divided organization of size 2. Now denote
m(; ;N) = 1  (N   2)
 
  N
2 (N   1)      :
By condition (18) and discussion above any majority rule M(m) with m < m(; ;N)
results in no divided organization forming in equilibrium. Further, using inequality (19)
one can see that
m(; ;N) = 1  (N   2)
 
  N
2 (N   1)      > 1  12 = 1=2:
Finally, consider an increase in the agentsheterogeneity via a change in the support of
the distribution of types. Then higher heterogeneity (higher  and lower ) corresponds
to a lower m(; ;N)
@
m(; ;N)
@
> 0; @
m(; ;N)
@
< 0:
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